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I.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-191 pandemic had a large impact on businesses
throughout the United States. 2 To mitigate the economic effects
of the pandemic, businessowners with insurance often turned to
their policy for relief.3 Many insureds4 have sought coverage for
losses incurred by the COVID-19 pandemic.5 However, with
COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims continually
being denied and courts commonly finding for the insurers,
insureds are often left without recourse.6 But are courts coming
to the proper conclusion in these cases? And is there another way
to cover an insured’s losses?
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* University of Minnesota Law School JD Candidate, Class of 2023; B.A.,
Vanderbilt University, 2020. Thank you to Professors Jon Lee and Daniel
Schwarcz, and editor Jesse Smith for their invaluable guidance and advice
throughout the note-writing process; to the staff and editors of the Minnesota
Journal of Law, Science, and Technology for their feedback and comments on
previous drafts of this Note; and to my friends, family, and partner, Sofia
Consing for their continued encouragement and support. All opinions expressed
in this Note, and any mistakes herein, are my own.
1. Although COVID-19 is the name of the disease caused by the SARSCoV-2 virus, throughout this paper it will be used to refer to both the disease
and the virus itself.
2. See Alexander Bartik et al., The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business
Outcomes and Expectations, 117 PNAS 17656, 17666 (2020) (discussing the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on small businesses in the United States).
3. See generally Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, U. PENN. L. SCH.,
https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/ [hereinafter Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker]
(last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (showing the number of insurance litigation
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic).
4. Throughout this paper, business owners will be referred to as insureds
and policyholders.
5. Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 3.
6. Id.
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This Note will address these two questions in an attempt to
find coverage for insureds for losses incurred during the COVID19 pandemic. The analysis will focus on business interruption
insurance claims in four parts. First, this Note will look at the
district and appellate courts’ COVID-19 business interruption
insurance litigation decisions to determine the main arguments
that courts are making in favor of insurers based on the
standard language of business interruption insurance policies.
Second, it will analyze the policy language to find ambiguity and
apply it to the doctrine of contra proferentem to make an
argument for coverage. Third, this Note will refute the insurer’s
argument that the COVID-19 pandemic is an uninsurable event
that they cannot cover. Finally, this Note will compare the
insurance industry’s response to COVID-19 with its response to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and show that the federal government
can use the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002 as a
blueprint for providing coverage to insureds in the current and
future viral pandemics.
In doing so, this Note will build off the previous scholarship
on COVID-19 business interruption insurance litigation,
particularly the works of Christopher French, Erik Knutsen, and
Paul McHugh. French and Knutsen primarily focused on the
arguments on both sides of the coverage debate7 and the
insureds’ arguments at court with a focus on the issues arising
from the insurers’ early denial of claims.8 McHugh, on the other
hand, focused on the various legislative attempts to create
coverage for insureds dealing with COVID-19 pandemic losses
and advocating for private sector involvement.9 Using these
sources as a backdrop, this Note expands the argument for
coverage in cases without a virus exclusion by looking deeper
into the ambiguity created by the standard policy language and
applying it to the doctrine of contra proferentem. Furthermore,
it will call for the federal government to provide assistance to

7. See Christopher C. French, COVID-19 Business Interruption Insurance
Losses: The Cases for and Against Coverage, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 5 (2020) (“This
Essay sets forth the arguments for and against business interruption policies
covering COVID-19 business interruption losses. It is the first Essay to do so.”).
8. See Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Infected Judgment:
Problematic Rush to Conventional Wisdom and Insurance Coverage Denial in a
Pandemic, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 185, 185, 190–94 (2020).
9. See Paul McHugh, Business Interruption Insurance in the Time of
Covid-19: Who Should Foot the Bill?, 19 J.L. & POL’Y, 491, 491, 515–20 (2021).
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insureds through a federal reinsurance program in addition to
immediate executive action.
This analysis will show that standard business interruption
insurance policies, in the absence of an explicit virus exclusion,
provide coverage for losses incurred by the COVID-19 pandemic
and that the government has previously set a precedent of being
able to assist the insurance industry in paying such potential
claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
1. COVID-19 Transmission
Coronaviruses, such as the one that causes COVID-19, are
not a new infectious agent. They are present in everyday life and
range from common infections like a cold to more deadly diseases
such as the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS).10
However, COVID-19 has had a greater impact on the world
because it is more infectious than other deadly coronaviruses
that have arisen over the years.11
COVID-19 is typically spread through water droplets and
other particles containing the virus that are released when a
person infected by the virus exhales, coughs, or sneezes. 12 As
others around that person breathe in the infected particles, or
the particles land on another’s eyes, nose, or mouth, they become
infected by the virus.13 These particles can also contaminate
surfaces that they come in contact with.14 The chance of this
spread increases when people are in close contact with one
another and in the absence of coverings over the nose and mouth
to catch the particles. 15 The spread of the virus can occur before
10. Yella Hewings-Martin, How Do SARS and MERS Compare with
COVID-19?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday
.com/articles/how-do-sars-and-mers-compare-with-covid-19#Coronavirusespast-and-present.
11. Id. (“SARS and MERS have significantly higher case fatality rates than
COVID-19. Yet COVID-19 is more infectious . . . .”).
12. COVID-19: Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html (last
updated Mar. 11, 2022).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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a person knows they are infected, making COVID-19 harder to
stop.16 Some estimate that each person infected with COVID-19
will infect two to three others.17
2. The United States’ Response to COVID-19 Infection
As COVID-19 infection rates and hospitalizations rose
rapidly in the United States, the government took measures to
slow the spread.18 Although the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) released various guidance documents during
the pandemic,19 and the federal government took precautionary
measures such as closing the borders to international
travelers,20 the response to COVID-19 has generally been
determined on a state-by-state basis. 21 Many states

16. Roz Plater, As Many as 80 Percent of People with COVID-19 Aren’t
Aware They Have the Virus, HEALTHLINE (May 28, 2020), https://www.health
line.com/health-news/50-percent-of-people-with-covid19-not-aware-have-virus;
see also Laura Nightengale, Superspreaders: These Factors Affect How Fast
COVID-19 Can Spread, OSF HEALTHCARE (Jul. 18, 2020), https://www.osf
healthcare.org/blog/superspreaders-these-factors-affect-how-fast-covid-19-canspread/ (describing how some people, “superspreaders,” are more susceptible to
spreading the virus).
17. Veronica Bravo & Janie Haseman, COVID-19: How Coronavirus
Spreads so Quickly and How You Can Slow it Down, USA TODAY, https://www
.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/news/coronavirus-covid-spread-quickly-howto-slow-it-down/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2021). This number has varied depending
on the stage of the pandemic and the current variant. What You Need to Know
About Variants, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc
.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/about-variants.html (last updated Feb. 25,
2022) (stating that the Delta variant “may spread more easily” than previous
variants and the Omicron variant “spreads more easily than other variants”).
18. Summary of Guidance for Public Health Strategies to Address High
Levels of Community Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and Related Deaths,
December 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6949e2.htm.
19. See generally COVID-19: Search Guidance Documents, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov
/communication/guidance-list.html?Sort=Date%3A%3Adesc (last visited Nov.
30, 2021) (providing a collection of guidance documents released by the CDC in
relation to the COVID-19 pandemic).
20. See Ally J. Levine, State by State, COVID-19 Grinds U.S. to a Halt,
REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://graphics.reuters.com/HEALTH-CORONA
VIRUS-USA/0100B5LQ46H/index.html (“On March 11, President Donald
Trump suspended travel from 26 European countries to the U.S. for a month.”).
21. See id.; James H. Fowler et al., Stay-at-Home Orders Associate with
Subsequent Decreases in COVID-19 Cases and Fatalities in the United States,
16 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2021) (“[T]he United States is a federal political system
where public health is normally the purview of the fifty states . . . As a result,
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implemented “stay at home” orders to help curb the spread of
COVID-19.22
California issued the first COVID-19 stay-at-home order on
March 19, 2020.23 This order, coming after many states closed
recreational and non-essential businesses such as movie
theatres and gyms, required people to stay at home unless
traveling for essential purposes.24 Essential purposes included
traveling for doctor’s visits, grocery stores, and working at
essential businesses. 25 During the pandemic, all but eight states
issued a statewide stay-at-home order.26 While these orders
helped reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus,27 they also had
a negative impact on businesses. 28

responses to COVID-19 varied across states and counties and led to spatial and
temporal variation in implementation of mitigation procedures.”).
22. See Levine, supra note 20 (“With little direction from the federal
government, state and local leaders began instituting their own restrictions to
slow the spread of the coronavirus in their jurisdictions.”); Levine, supra note
20.
23. Press Release from Governor Gavin Newsom (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/03/19/governor-gavin-newsom-issues-stay-athome-order/#:~:text=SACRAMENTO%20%E2%80%93%20Today%2C%
20Governor%20Gavin%20Newsom,can%20also%20be%20found%20here.
24. Levine, supra note 20.
25. Id.
26. See Jiachuan Wu et al., Stay-at-Home Orders Across the Country: What
Each State is Doing—or Not Doing—Amid Widespread Coronavirus Lockdowns,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/hereare-stay-home-orders-across-country-n1168736 (showing that, out of the fifty
United States, all but North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and
Arkansas issued a stay-at-home order in at least part of the state and that of
the states that issued a stay-at-home order, all but Wyoming, Utah, and
Oklahoma issued the order state-wide).
27. See Fowler et al., supra note 21, at 5 (discussing the decrease in COVID19 case growth within a state after the implementation of a stay-at-home order).
28. See, e.g., Robert Fairlie, The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business
Owners: Evidence from the First Three Months After Widespread SocialDistancing Restrictions, 29 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 727, 728 (2020) (“[T]he
number of working business owners plummeted from 15.0 million in February
2020 to 11.7 million in April 2020 because of COVID-19 mandates and healthand economic-driven demand shifts.”); Kathryn Zickuhr, How COVID-19 is
Affecting Small Businesses in D.C., D.C. POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/small-businesses-coronavirus
(discussing the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on small businesses in
Washington, D.C.).
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Stay-at-home orders forced many businesses to shut down.29
This led to large losses for industries that rely on person-toperson interaction, such as personal and laundry services,
travel, and restaurants. 30 These businesses were not deemed
essential and could not be operated while stay-at-home orders
were active.31 Many of the affected businesses were small
businesses that operated on slim profit margins. 32 Even if they
could stay open during the pandemic, the costs of complying with
new safety protocols imposed a significant burden.33 As a result,
the number of active business owners decreased by 3.3 million
after the stay-at-home orders were issued.34 At least 200,000 of
these businesses permanently closed in 2020. 35 For those that
were able to reopen, it may take five or more years to fully
recover.36
The current decreasing case numbers, however, have
allowed states to ease restrictions and greatly helped businesses,
who are now able to reopen and serve the public.37 Even so, the

29. See Fairlie, supra note 28, at 730 (discussing the loss of 3.3 million
active business owners in the United States after states implemented stay-athome orders).
30. See id. at 735 (showing the percent change in the number of business
owners by industry between February and June 2020).
31. See Connie Lin, What is an ‘Essential’ Business Anyway? A Cheat Sheet
for Getting Through the COVID-19 Pandemic, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90484557/what-is-an-essential-businessanyway-a-cheat-sheet-for-getting-through-the-covid-19-pandemic (providing a
list of businesses that were generally considered to be essential during the
COVID-19 pandemic).
32. See André Dua et al., US Small-Business Recovery After the COVID-19
Crisis, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 7, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries
/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/us-small-business-recovery-after-thecovid-19-crisis (“Among respondents to our survey, close to a third were
operating at a loss or breaking even prior to the crisis.”).
33. Id.
34. Fairlie, supra note 28, at 730.
35. See Juliana Kaplan, 85% of Small Businesses Were Fully Open in
March, Report Finds, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2021), https://www.businessinsider
.com/85-small-businesses-fully-open-kabbage-report-2021-5
(“[A]n
extra
200,000 businesses in the US closed in 2020.”).
36. See Dua et al., supra note 32 (“Recovery will take time . . . [and] will
depend on both economic vulnerability to the COVID-19 response and the
prevailing macroeconomic outlook in their respective industries. Across all
businesses, that could take five years or longer.”).
37. See Kaplan, supra note 35 (“Increased vaccinations, the ability to hire
staff, and lifted restrictions all contributed to the more robust reopening
numbers.”).
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growing number of COVID-19 variants threatens to send the
United States back into more lockdowns, and could halt the
recovery process of businesses across the country.38
B. INSURANCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Regulation by the Individual States
In the United States, insurance is heavily regulated by the
individual states, with each state largely developing its own
rules and policies of interpretation.39 This policy of individual
regulation was developed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945. 40 Congress created the Act “to restore the supremacy of the
states in the realm of insurance regulation”41 and “to provide
insurers with certain exceptions from antitrust laws.”42 This
allows state law to supersede federal laws of general
applicability that would regulate “the business of insurance.”43
To determine if a law deals with the business of insurance,
courts typically consider three factors: “(1) whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk;
(2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3)
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry.”44
38. See, e.g., Kathy Katella, 5 Things to Know About the Delta Variant,
YALE MED., https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/5-things-to-know-delta-variant
-covid (last updated Mar. 1, 2022) (discussing the COVID-19 Delta variant and
how it differs from the original COVID-19 strain); Adrianna Rodriguez, First
Known Death from Omicron Variant Reported in the UK. Everything To Know
About the Latest COVID Strain, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/health/2021/11/29/omicron-variant-symptoms-mutations-vaccines
/8791946002 (last updated Dec. 13, 2021) (discussing the COVID-19 Omicron
variant, including concerns that current vaccines will not be effective against
it).
39. Commercial Insurance: Regulation, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org
/publications/commercial-insurance/how-it-functions/regulation
[hereinafter
Commercial Insurance: Regulation] (last visited Nov. 30, 2021).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15; e.g., STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 1 COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 2:4 (3d ed. 2021).
41. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 40 (1996) (quoting
Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993)).
42. PLITT ET AL., supra note 40.
43. Id. at § 2:5.
44. Id.; see, e.g., Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329,
339 (2003) (applying the three factors to determine if practices constituted the
“business of insurance”).
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2. Role of Ambiguity, Contra Proferentem, and the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine
Although the individual states regulate insurance, some
rules are common across multiple legal schemes. One of the most
common rules classifies insurance contracts as a type of
adhesion contract,45 where the parties have significantly uneven
bargaining power.46 Often, the signing party does not have the
power to negotiate or modify the terms of the contract. 47 In
insurance policies, the purchaser is usually only able to review
the policy after purchasing it.48 Even if the purchaser has such
an opportunity, they have little, if any, bargaining power over
the terms.49 Because of this, courts often construe coverage
broadly and exclusions to coverage narrowly in favor of the
insured.50 In doing so, courts have adopted special rules of
interpretation to deal with ambiguity in insurance policies.51
The standard test to find ambiguity in an insurance policy “is
whether the policy language can be reasonably interpreted in
different ways.”52 Once the court finds ambiguity, which can be

45. See, e.g., Sonson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 100 A.3d 1, 2 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2014) (quoting Rumbin v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 526, 529 n.6 (Conn.
2000)) (“Standardized contracts of insurance continue to be prime examples of
contracts of adhesion.”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply
Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. 2006) (“At the same time, as we have
recognized, insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.”).
46. Adhesion Contract (Contract of Adhesion), CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_(contract_of
_adhesion) (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
47. See id. (“Because adhesion contracts do not afford consumers a realistic
opportunity to bargain, the consumers are often faced with adhesion contracts
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Under such conditions, the consumer has little to
no ability to negotiate more favorable terms.”).
48. French, supra note 7, at 10 (“Insurance policies arguably are not really
contracts because they are non-negotiable, and the purchaser generally does not
get a chance to review the policy before purchasing it.”).
49. 4 Things You Need to Know About a Contract of Adhesion and
Insurance, CLAIMSMATE (July 11, 2016), https://claimsmate.com/4-things-youneed-to-know-about-a-contract-of-adhesion-and-insurance/ (“Few—if any—
insurance companies allow you to negotiate your contract or change the
terms.”).
50. See French, supra note 7, at 10–12 (discussing the basic rules courts
apply when reviewing an insurance policy during a coverage dispute).
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 13.
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encouraged by the reasonable expectations doctrine, courts often
apply the doctrine of contra proferentem.53
In its original form, the doctrine of reasonable expectations
was a way of finding coverage for the insured.54 In the presence
of ambiguity, the court considers the reasonable expectations of
the insured party at the time the policy was purchased to
determine if there is coverage.55 Because insureds typically do
not have a chance to review or negotiate policy terms prior to
purchasing the policy, courts adopt this doctrine to protect them
“from policy language that unfairly favors [the] insurers . . . .”56
Following this doctrine, courts can disregard language in the
policy if it does not align with the coverage that the insured
reasonably believed they had.57
Today, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is rarely used
by courts in its original form.58 Rather, courts today use it as

53. See id. at 12–15 (discussing the doctrines of contra proferentem and
reasonable expectations in the interpretation of insurance policies).
54. See, e.g., President v. Jenkins, 853 A.2d 247, 254 (N.J. 2004) (“When
members of the public purchase policies of insurance they are entitled to the
broad measure of protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations.
They should not be subjected to technical encumbrances or to hidden pitfalls
and their policies should be construed liberally in their favor to the end that
coverage is afforded to the full extent that any fair interpretation will allow.”
(quoting Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 26 (N.J.1961))).
55. Id.; see French, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing how, under the
reasonable expectations doctrine, “the policyholder should receive the coverage
that it reasonably thought it had purchased, even if the claim is not covered
under the express terms of the policy language”).
56. French, supra note 7, at 14.
57. Id. at 15 (“[T]he policy language is not always controlling because the
policyholder’s expectations regarding the coverage it is purchasing is not based
upon the policy language itself and it has no ability to reject the policy
language.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. L.
INST. 1981) (“Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained
a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”); id. at cmt. c
(mentioning insurance policies and other standard form contracts as instances
where the written language sometimes needs to be overruled).
58. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION 65 (7th ed. 2020) (“Although many courts continue to incorporate
some version of the reasonable expectations doctrine into their analysis, many
other courts have completely rejected the doctrine in its entirety . . . Courts that
continue to embrace some version of the doctrine almost universally limit its
application to consumer-oriented policies.”).
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another tool to find ambiguity, but do not extend it to overrule
the plain, unambiguous, language of the policy.59
The doctrine of contra proferentem allows courts to construe
ambiguities in the contract against the drafter.60 For insurance
policies, this often leads to courts interpreting the policy against
the insurance company and in favor of the insured, leading to it
occasionally being referred to as “the contra-insurer rule.”61
Under contra proferentem, a court will often not look to extrinsic
evidence in deciding the question of ambiguity.62 Rather,
because the insurance companies had the power to draft the
contract as they saw fit, they could have clearly defined the
coverage limits and avoided the ambiguity.63
3. The Role of the ISO and the Virus Exclusion Policy
While the individual states regulate insurance within their
jurisdiction, some organizations provide guidance for insurance
providers. One of the primary organizations that does so is the
Insurance Services Office (ISO).64 The ISO “develops standard
policy forms and files or lodges them with each State’s insurance
59. See Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 757 S.E.2d 399, 407 (S.C. 2014)
(“[W]hile we now hold that reasonable expectations may be used as another
interpretative tool, the doctrine cannot be used to alter the plain terms of an
insurance policy.”).
60. Jeffrey Gordon & Paul Sullivan, Contra Proferentem Doesn’t Always
Mean ‘Against the Insurer’, JD SUPRA (July 22, 2016), https://www.jdsupra
.com/legalnews/contra-proferentem-doesn-t-always-mean-89102/.
61. See, e.g., Jefferson Block 24 Oil & Gas LLC v. Aspen Ins. U.K. Ltd., 652
F.3d 584, 595 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Moreover, ‘[i]f the extrinsic evidence does not
yield a conclusive answer as to the parties’ intent, it is appropriate for a court
to resort to other rules of construction, including the contra-insurer rule, which
state that any ambiguity in an insurance policy should be resolved in favor of
the insured.’” (quoting McCostis v. Home Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
1994))).
62. Randy D. Henry, An Analysis of Interpretation of Insurance Contracts:
Common Law Versus Strict Contra Proferentem, 36 J. INS. REG. 1, 4 (2017); see
ABRAHMAN & SCHWARCZ, supra note 58, at 51 (stating that the majority rule
for contra proferentem is to only look at extrinsic evidence, such as past judicial
decisions, definition, regulations, and the facts of the loss after determining that
the policy language is ambiguous). But see Peak v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 544
(Iowa 2011) (rejecting the majority rule and allowing extrinsic evidence even
when the policy itself is not ambiguous).
63. Henry, supra note 62, at 4.
64. See Frequently Asked Question: General Questions, V ERISK,
https://www.verisk.com/insurance/about/faq/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2021). After
expanding their business, the ISO typically does not use the name ISO in recent
communications, instead going by the name Verisk. Id.
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regulators.”65 Insurers across the country then apply the forms,
or a variant of them, to their policies.66
In 2006, the ISO filed form CP 01 40 07 06, titled “Exclusion
Of Loss Due to Virus Or Bacteria.”67 This form was written to
address ISO’s concerns that standard business interruption
policies did not exclude coverage for viral outbreaks such as
SARS.68 If included in an insurance policy, it explicitly “state[s]
that there is no coverage for loss or damage caused by or
resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that
induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or
disease.”69 The ISO wrote this exclusion to protect insurers in
the event of a “pandemic or hitherto unorthodox transmission of
infectious material” that would lead to coverage under a policy,
and intended it to apply to “property damage, time element and
all other coverages.”70
4. Business Interruption Insurance
Business interruption coverage is a common form of
insurance in the United States. Many business owners purchase
it to protect themselves and their businesses in the event of a
disaster that temporarily shuts them down. 71 In particular, “[i]t
pays your bills that continue during the interruption and any

65. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).
66. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007);
see also Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U.
CHICAGO L. REV. 1263, 1274 (2011) (“[C]ourts and commentators in recent years
have sporadically observed that some companies have particularized language
in their policies that deviates from the industry norm.”).
67. Larry Podoshen, New Endorsements Filed to Address Exclusion of Loss
Due to Virus or Bacteria, INS. SERVS. OFF., (July 6, 2006) [hereinafter ISO
Circular].
68. Angela Elbert, Revisionist Insurance History for Virus-Related Damage
and Losses: Don’t Believe the Insurance Industry’s Assertion that the
Coronavirus Can’t Cause Physical Loss of or Damage to Property, JD SUPRA
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/revisionist-insurancehistory-for-virus-20156/.
69. ISO Circular, supra note 67, at 8.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See Kimberly Lankford, What is Business Interruption Insurance
Coverage and What Does it Cover?, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 23, 2021), https://money
.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/saving-and-budgeting/articles/what-isbusiness-interruption-insurance (“Some businesses also have business
interruption insurance, also called business income insurance, which can cover
lost income and continuing expenses while the business is closed or being
repaired because of the disaster.”).
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profit you would have earned.”72 Business interruption
insurance typically includes a restoration period dictating the
amount of time that the policy will pay for covered losses
incurred from the interruption.73 Additionally, similar to other
types of insurance coverage, business interruption insurance
policies are typically “drafted by insurers and then sold on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”74
Modern business interruption insurance policies, however,
limit what type of disasters will trigger coverage. 75 One
limitation commonly included in business interruption
insurance policies is a statement limiting coverage to damages
and suspensions of business “caused by direct physical loss of or
damage to property.”76
Although business interruption insurance is widely
available to business owners, many small business owners do
not have coverage.77 Only 30–40% of small business owners have
business interruption insurance.78 This leaves many business
owners without recourse if a peril forces them to temporarily
close.79

72. Id.
73. See Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/article/do-i-need-business-interruption-insurance
[hereinafter Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?] (last visited Dec. 2,
2021) (detailing business interruption insurance coverage and what a
restoration period is).
74. French, supra note 7, at 7.
75. See, e.g., Lankford, supra note 71 (providing examples of what is not
covered under a standard business interruption policy).
76. Mark Ian Binsky & Glenn A. Jacobson, Is Business Interruption
Insurance Immune to the COVID-19 Virus?, HARMONIE GROUP, https://www
.harmonie.org/business-interruption-insurance-covid19 (last visited Dec. 2,
2021).
77. See Business Interruption/Businessowners Policies (BOP), NAT’L ASS’N
INS. COMM’RS, https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_business_interruption
businessowners_policies_bop.htm
[hereinafter
Business
Interruption/
Businessowners Policies (BOP)] (last updated Dec. 9, 2020).
78. Id.
79. See Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?, supra note 73
(discussing the benefit of having business interruption insurance).
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C. THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE TO 9/11
The insurance industry has faced large-scale disruptions in
the past, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 80 The 9/11 terrorist
attacks cost insurers worldwide an estimated $40–50 billion,81
making it the most expensive insurance event in history.82
Approximately 33% of this cost went to business interruption
expenses.83 Prior to this event, insurers often did not consider
terrorism as a risk because the losses were small and the events
were uninsurable intentional acts.84 Instead, they were
concerned about losses caused by “acts of war” and therefore
excluded them from the policy.85 These war exclusions only
excluded coverage for “actions of a military force directed by a
sovereign power.”86 However, the terrorist attacks, because a
government did not orchestrate them, were found to be
coverable.87 The insurance industry, by not explicitly excluding
acts of terrorism from policies, had to cover the losses.88

80. See generally INT’L ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF INS. ECONS., INSURANCE
AND SEPTEMBER 11 ONE YEAR AFTER: IMPACT, LESSONS AND UNRESOLVED
ISSUES (Patrick Liedtke & Christophe Courbage eds., 2002) (containing a series

of essays discussing the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the insurance
industry in the US and abroad).
81. This amount is in United States Dollars.
82. Patrick M. Liedtke & Christophe Courbage, September 11: Might of the
Moment—Enduring Effects, in INSURANCE AND SEPTEMBER 11 ONE YEAR
AFTER: IMPACT, LESSONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES, supra note 80, at 1–2.
83. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), NAT’L. ASS’N INS. COMM’RS,
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_terrorism_risk_insurance_act_tria
.htm (last updated Oct. 28, 2021).
84. Id.
85. Robert P. Hartwig, The Impact of September 11 Attacks on the American
Insurance Industry, in INSURANCE AND SEPTEMBER 11 ONE YEAR AFTER:
IMPACT, LESSONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES, supra note 80, at 17 (“[A]ct of war
exclusions are found in virtually every commercial property and personal
property insurance policy.”).
86. War Exclusion, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., https://www.irmi.com/term
/insurance-definitions/war-exclusion (last visited March 3, 2022). The war,
however, does not need to be declared to fall under the exclusion. Id.
87. See William Bailey, The Impact of 9/11 on the United States Insurance
Industry’s Business Interruption Underwriting, in INSURANCE AND SEPTEMBER
11 ONE YEAR AFTER: IMPACT, LESSONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES, supra note
80, at 150 (“It is estimated that the terrorist attack against the United States
on September 11, 2001, will cost the insurance industry US $40 billion. It
appears that business interruption coverage will be the largest single
component of the total losses.”).
88. Id.
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After being forced to cover the losses caused by 9/11, the
insurance industry wanted to find a way to prevent itself from
shouldering the costs of another attack. 89 Insurers began to cut
back and stop offering coverage for terrorist attacks, defining
them as uninsurable risks. 90 The ISO further filed for permission
from all states to exclude terrorism coverage from commercial
insurance policies.91 This left the majority of commercial
insurance policyholders without coverage. Fighting for coverage,
many industries requested federal intervention to supply
coverage for terrorist attacks. 92 This led to the passage of
TRIA.93
Congress initially passed TRIA as a three-year federal
reinsurance94 program to protect insurers in the case of terrorist
attacks. 95 Since then, it has been extended multiple times and is
currently in effect through 2027.96 The program has three
primary goals: “to (1) create a temporary federal program of
shared public and private compensation for insured terrorism
losses to allow the private market to stabilize; (2) protect
consumers by ensuring the availability and affordability of
insurance for terrorism risks; and (3) preserve state regulation
of insurance.”97

89. See id. at 151 (“The insurance industry’s earlier response, ‘We will pay,’
was revised to ‘We will pay—for this one—but not another one. We don’t have
the capital to survive another event like this and still be able to pay for all of
our other, existing commitments.’”).
90. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), supra note 83.
91. Id. These exclusion filings were approved in every state (as well as
Washington DC, Guam, and Puerto Rico) except for California, Florida,
Georgia, New York, and Texas. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Reinsurance is the method of insurance companies sharing risk by
purchasing insurance policies from other providers as a way of limiting their
loss in the event of a large-scale disaster or a large number of claims. Caroline
Banton, What is Reinsurance?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia
.com/ask/answers/08/reinsurance.asp (last updated June 23, 2021).
95. BAIRD WEBEL, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE: OVERVIEW AND ISSUE
ANALYSIS FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 1 (2019).
96. Id.; see also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), supra note 83 (“On
Dec. 20, 2019, President Donald Trump signed into law the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2019 (P. L. 116-94), which extended
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (TRIP) for seven years through Dec. 31,
2027.”).
97. WEBEL, supra note 95, at 3.
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In accomplishing these goals, TRIA does two noticeable
things. First, it establishes a minimum threshold for
government involvement and a way for the government to
recoup losses that it may sustain.98 The federal government will
not begin to help an insurer until the insurer has to pay out a
deductible “equaling 20% of [their] direct earned premiums for
the commercial property and casualty lines of insurance
specified in TRIA.”99 Then, the government will cover “81% of
[the] insurer’s losses above its deductible until the amount of
losses totals $100 billion.”100 However, these provisions will only
apply if the act of terrorism generates an aggregate loss to the
insurance industry of greater than $200 million.101
To ensure that this will not damage the government’s
finances, the United States Treasury Department “is required to
recoup 140% of the government outlays through surcharges on
property and casualty insurance policies” for attacks that cause
less than $37.5 billion in insured losses.102 For losses greater
than $37.5 billion, the treasury secretary can decide how much
to recoup based on the size of the uncompensated losses incurred
by the insurance industry.103
Second, TRIA preserves the states’ power to regulate the
insurance industry.104 State control over insurance within its
borders is a core aspect of American insurance regulation. 105 To
protect this, TRIA explicitly states that “[n]othing in this title
shall affect the jurisdiction or regulatory authority of the
insurance commissioner of a state.” 106 However, to ensure that
the act would have its intended effect of protecting insureds
suffering from an act of terrorism, it included two exceptions: (1)
The act “preempts any state definition of an ‘act of terrorism’ in
favor of the federal definition,” and (2) the act “preempts state

98. See id. at 3–6 (describing terrorism loss sharing criteria).
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. The numbers included in this paragraph were valid as of 2019. The
values have been continually updated since TRIA was passed. Id. at 5 n.18.
104. See id. at 6.
105. See infra Part II.B.1. and accompanying footnotes (discussing the state
control of insurance regulations).
106. WEBEL, supra note 95, at 6.
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laws with respect to insurance policy exclusions for acts of
terrorism.”107
While COVID-19 has greatly impacted the insurance
industry, this is not the first industry-altering event that has
occurred. By looking at the current state of business interruption
insurance claim litigation, courts can find ambiguity, supported
by the reasonable expectations doctrine, that will allow the
doctrine of contra proferentem to find coverage for insureds.
Additionally, the federal government’s intervention through
TRIA that protected the insurance industry and policyholders
after 9/11 shows that COVID-19 and future viral pandemics are
insurable risks that the government can help cover.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF COVID-19 BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
INSURANCE LITIGATION
The COVID-19 pandemic caused many businesses to shut
down or restrict business operations.108 Many business owners,
in an attempt to cover their losses, looked to their business
interruption insurance policies.109
As of January 16, 2022, insureds have filed 2,111 COVID19 related insurance claims in the United States courts. 110 Of
these, 1,970 have sought coverage for business income, and 680
claims involved an insurance policy without a virus or broad
communicable disease exclusion.111 Regardless of the policy,
however, the majority of cases have been resolved in favor of the
insurers.112

107. Id. TRIA included a third, now expired, exception that “preempted state
rate and form approval laws for terrorism insurance from enactment to the end
of 2003.” Id.
108. Fairlie, supra note 28, at 730.
109. See generally Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 3 (showing
the number of business interruption insurance litigation cases that have been
filed during the COVID-19 pandemic).
110. CCLT Case List, COVID COVERAGE LITIG. TRACKER, U. PENN. L. SCH.,
https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/cclt-case-list/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
111. Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 3.
112. See Eli Flesch, Hotel in Versace Mansion Gets Split Virus Coverage
Ruling, LAW360 (Nov. 10, 2021), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/57675918
-cff2-4291-8f16-ad5796eba3bd/?context=1530671 (“In state courts, a relatively
more favorable venue for policyholders, more than 66% [of] pandemic coverage
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Districts courts have primarily based their decisions on two
arguments: (1) Whether the loss of use caused by the pandemic
is a physical loss or damage as required by the business
interruption policy,113 and (2) the applicability of a virus
exclusion in a policy.114
A typical business interruption insurance policy covers
losses caused by a “physical loss of or damage to” the property.115
Many courts have found that coverage is not applicable because
there has not been a physical loss of or damage to the property.116
For instance, in Zwillo V, Corporation v. Lexington Insurance
Company, Zwillo claimed that Lexington Insurance “wrongfully
denied coverage under [their] policy” after the COVID-19 virus
and stay-at-home orders led to “an 80 percent loss of revenue.”117
The court, in granting Lexington’s motion to dismiss, found that
“the term ‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ does not
encompass simple deprivation of use.”118 Other courts have
found that no “physical loss of or damage to” the property has
occurred because “[t]he coronavirus does not physically alter the
appearance, shape, color, structure, or other material dimension
of the property.”119
Insureds, however, can sometimes prevail against a motion
to dismiss if they allege the physical presence of the virus on

suits have still been tossed, according to the University of Pennsylvania Carey
Law School.”).
113. See e.g., John DiMugno, The Implications of COVID-19 for the
Insurance Industry and Its Consumers: 2021 Developments, 43 INS. LITIG. REP.
NL 1 (2021) (discussing various COVID-19 business interruption cases where
courts have come to different conclusions regarding what entails physical or loss
or damage to the property).
114. Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 8, at 269–70 (discussing the reliance by
insurers on virus exclusions and why they sometimes may not apply).
115. Binsky & Jacobson, supra note 76.
116. See, e.g., Zwillo V, Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 3d 1034,
1040 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (“[T]he term ‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ does not
encompass simple deprivation of use.”); Michael Cetta, Inc. v. Admiral
Indemnity Co., 506 F. Supp. 3d 168, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“The plain meaning
of the phrase ‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ therefore connotes a negative
alteration in the tangible condition of property.”).
117. 504 F. Supp. 3d at 1036.
118. Id. at 1040. The Court additionally found that a virus exclusion in the
policy also prevented recovery. Id. at 1041.
119. Sandy Point Dental, PC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp.3 d 690, 694
(N.D. Ill. 2020).
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their property.120 In Studio 417, Incorporated v. Cincinnati
Insurance Company, the Court denied Cincinnati Insurance
Company’s motion to dismiss by finding that Studio 417’s
allegations “that COVID-19 particles attached to and damaged
their property, which made their premises unsafe and unusable”
constituted a direct physical loss. 121
Insureds have also commonly lost in court because their
insurance policy contains a virus exclusion.122 A virus exclusion,
such as the one drafted by the ISO,123 typically excludes coverage
for loss or damage caused by viruses directly or indirectly.124
When an express viral exclusion applies, the insurer has a
strong argument that they do not need to cover the losses even
if they would otherwise fall under the policy.125
Some insureds, in an attempt to avoid the virus exclusion,
are arguing that the government shutdowns, rather than the
virus, caused their losses.126 This argument can make it harder
to show a physical loss or damage that the policy covers.127
However, when the policy provides civil authority coverage,

120. See Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 478 F. Supp. 3d 794, 800
(W.D. Mo. 2020) (finding that “[p]laintiffs have adequately alleged a direct
physical loss” by claiming that the COVID-19 virus is a physical substance that
was present on the surfaces of their business).
121. Id. at 802–03.
122. See, e.g., Lisette Enters. v. Regent Ins. Co., 537 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1047
(S.D. Iowa 2021) (“Plaintiff’s claim is rendered non-compensable by the Virus
Exclusion.”); Ben Zigterman, Virus Exclusion Dooms NJ Wedding Venue’s
COVID Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2021) https://www.law360.com/classaction
/articles/1435015/virus-exclusion-dooms-nj-wedding-venue-s-covid-suit
(discussing the applicability of a virus exclusion policy in a New Jersey business
interruption claim).
123. See infra Part II.B.3. (discussing the ISO standard virus exclusion).
124. Lisette Enters, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 1047.
125. See Zigterman, supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the
applicability of a virus exclusion policy in a New Jersey business interruption
claim).
126. E.g., Nguyen v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 541 F. Supp. 3d 1200,
1217–18 (W.D. Wash. 2021) (“COVID-19, and more specifically the Governor’s
Proclamations, may have limited the uses of the property by preventing certain
indoor activities previously conducted on the premises, but they did not cause
dispossession of the buildings, chairs, dental tools, etc.”); Kahn v. Pa. Nat’l Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 3d 315, 326–27 (M.D. Penn. 2021) (“Even if South
Carolina’s various orders did prohibit access to Mauldin’s, there is no allegation
that the orders arose due to ‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ nearby
property.”).
127. See, e.g., Nguyen, 541 F. Supp. 3d at 1217–18; Kahn, 517 F. Supp. 3d at
326–27.
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some courts have found that the executive orders causing
businesses to temporarily close are enough to invoke business
interruption insurance coverage even when a virus exclusion is
present.128 For instance, in Seifert v. IMT Insurance Company,
the court found that the insured’s alleged losses were caused by
the executive orders rather than the virus itself and denied the
insurer’s motion to dismiss.129 Writing for the court, Judge
Tunheim analyzed the policy’s requirement of a “ direct physical
loss of or damage to property.”130 He found that the inclusion of
the word “of” in connection with physical loss gives it a separate
meaning from the phrase “damage to.”131 Therefore, the insured
was able to show a “physical loss of property by alleging that
executive orders forced a business to close because the property
was deemed dangerous to use and its owner was thereby
deprived of lawfully occupying and controlling the premises to
provide services within it.”132 The insured is thus able to make a
valid claim under only the executive orders without having to
worry about the presence of the virus or a virus exclusion. 133 This
interpretation, however, is not commonly adopted by other
courts, leading to many claims being dismissed. 134
Recently, many insureds have appealed their dismissed
claims. 135 Unfortunately for the policyholders, the venue change
has led to similar results. 136 The appellate courts are still
128. Seifert v. IMT Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 3d 874, 881–82 (D. Minn. 2021);
Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 8, at 262–63.
129. Seifert, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 882.
130. Id. at 878.
131. Id. at 879 (“As courts have stated when considering similar business
interruption claims, ‘to’ and ‘of’ are not interchangeable; that is, they mean
distinctly different things.”).
132. Id. at 880.
133. See id. at 882 (finding that because the insured alleged that the losses
were caused by the executive orders rather than the virus, and because no
contamination of the premises or staff was argued, the virus exclusion was not
applicable).
134. See, e.g., Kahn v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 3d 315, 326–
27 (M.D. Penn. 2021) (discussing a civil authority coverage provision).
135. See generally Appeals, COVID COVERAGE LITIG. TRACKER, U. PENN. L.
SCH., https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/appeals/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2021) (showing the
results of appellate cases in the COVID-19 insurance coverage litigation
pursuit).
136. See id.; see also Eli Flesch, 1st Calif. Virus Coverage Appeal Goes
Against Hotelier, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles
/1440765 (discussing the win granted to the insurer in the first COVID-19
coverage case heard on appeal in California).
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generally finding in favor of the insurers by finding that (1) a
virus exclusion prevents recovery under the policy, or (2) there
was no physical loss of or damage to the property.137
B. THE LACK OF AN EXPLICIT VIRUS EXCLUSION CREATES
AMBIGUITY THAT COURTS SHOULD RESOLVE IN FAVOR OF THE
INSURED
Courts have erroneously ruled in favor of insurers in cases
that do not involve a virus exclusion. Without a virus exclusion,
and considering the reasonable expectations of insureds, these
policies are inherently ambiguous regarding whether they cover
losses incurred by COVID-19. Because such ambiguity exists,
the doctrine of contra proferentem applies. 138 By finding
ambiguity and applying this doctrine, courts can find that, in the
absence of a virus exclusion, and in the presence of the virus,
business interruption insurance policies cover losses incurred
because of the COVID-19.
1. Finding Ambiguity in Policies Without a Virus Exclusion
Courts must find ambiguity in an insurance policy before
they can apply the doctrine of contra proferentem.139 Generally,
ambiguity is present when “the policy language can be
reasonably interpreted in different ways.”140 For COVID-19
business interruption insurance claims, the ambiguity

137. See, e.g., Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 885,
894 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding that the virus exclusion policy barred Mudpie’s
claim); Gilreath Family & Cosmetic Dentistry, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No.
21-11046, 2021 WL 3870697, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021) (finding that
Gilreath did not allege any harm that qualified as a physical loss or damage);
Santo’s Italian Café LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2021)
(“The novel coronavirus did not physically affect the property in the way, say,
fire or water damage would.”). However, it is important to note that Santo’s
Italian Café references, in dicta, that the restaurant does not argue that the
virus itself caused damage, potentially showing that this could be a valid
argument. Id.
138. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing ambiguity and its role in the doctrines
of contra proferentem and reasonable expectations).
139. See French, supra note 7 at 12–13 (“In many states, the ambiguity test
is whether the policy language can be reasonably interpreted in different ways.
If the policyholder and insurer both have reasonable interpretations, then the
policy language should be construed in favor of coverage because it is deemed
ambiguous.”).
140. Id. at 13.
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surrounds the requirement of a “physical loss of or damage to
[the] property.”141
The physical loss or damage requirement is standard in
most business interruption insurance policies.142 At first glance,
this requirement seems straightforward—insureds must show
that the property was physically damaged. However, the
question then shifts to whether a virus has the capability to do
so. Courts have heavily debated this question in the early stages
of COVID-19 insurance cases and have reached conflicting
results.143 The ability of different courts to find both that the
presence of the virus can cause physical damage and that it
cannot144 shows that there are two reasonable interpretations of
the physical loss or damage requirement. Therefore, the
disagreement among the courts provides evidence that this
provision is ambiguous.145
The definition of the word “physical” furthers the argument
for ambiguity. In the phrase “physical loss or damage,”
“physical” is likely defined as “having material existence:
perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws
of nature.”146 The virus itself, although not visible to the naked
eye, is still perceptible through the senses with the help of an
electron microscope and is subject to the laws of nature.147 When
the virus is then found on the premises, its presence causes
damage to the property by making it unusable. Although this
141. Binsky & Jacobson, supra note 76.
142. Id.
143. Compare Michael Cetta, Inc. v. Admiral Indem. Co., 506 F. Supp. 3d
168, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“The plain meaning of the phrase ‘direct physical loss
of or damage to’ therefore connotes a negative alteration in the tangible
condition of property.”), with Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 478 F. Supp.
3d 794, 800 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (finding that “[p]laintiffs have adequately alleged
a direct physical loss” by claiming that the COVID-19 virus is a physical
substance that was present on the surfaces of their business).
144. Supra Part III.A. (discussing how some courts find that the presence of
the COVID-19 virus creates a physical loss or damage while others have found
that it doesn’t).
145. See French, supra note 7, at 13 (“[I]f the same language has been
interpreted in different ways by different courts, then the inconsistencies may
be treated and indicia that the policy language is ambiguous.”).
146. Physical,
MERRIAN-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/physical (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
147. See generally Cynthia S. Goldsmith & Sara E. Miller, Modern Uses of
Electron Microscopy for Detection of Viruses, 22 CLINICAL MICROBIAL REV. 552
(2009) (discussing how electron microscopes can be used to see and detect
viruses).
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damage is not immediately visible, it still prevents the use of the
premises by causing contamination, thereby satisfying the
physical loss requirement.148
Additionally, the insurance industry identified the ability of
a viral outbreak to satisfy a business interruption insurance
policy’s physical loss or damage requirement long ago. In 2006,
the ISO released a circular detailing their new proposed virus
exclusion that was filed throughout the country.149 The ISO
acknowledged that general contamination exclusions in
insurance policies do not cover viruses and that “viral and
bacterial contaminations are specific types that appear to
warrant particular attention.” 150 If viruses were unable to
satisfy the physical loss or damage requirement, it would be
unnecessary to address them in a separate exclusion. At a
minimum, this shows that a reasonable person can interpret the
policy as being satisfied by viral contamination, making the
policy’s physical loss or damage provision ambiguous.
Finally, the reasonable expectations doctrine further
highlights the ambiguity created by the lack of a virus exclusion.
The application of the reasonable expectations doctrine will
depend on the reasonable expectations of the insured when they
purchased the policy.151 Insureds purchase business
interruption coverage to protect themselves and their businesses
from “monetary losses due to periods of suspended operations
when a covered event . . . causes physical property damage.”152
This is the type of loss that COVID-19 has caused—shutdowns
and lost income.153 In purchasing their policy, insureds expect
that sudden losses such as these will be covered. Furthermore,
they are generally unable to negotiate the policy before signing
and are not expected to read it after,154 showing that it is

148. See Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165232, at *13–17 (discussing various cases where a
contamination rendering a property unusable satisfies the physical loss
requirement of a business interruption insurance policy).
149. ISO Circular, supra note 67, at 1.
150. Id.
151. French, supra note 7, at 14.
152. Business Interruption/Businessowners Policies (BOP), supra note 77.
153. Fairlie, supra note 28, at 730.
154. See Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholder’s Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance
Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363 (1998) (discussing how insureds usually
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unlikely they would understand a viral pandemic is not a
covered loss unless a virus exclusion is explicitly stated in the
policy. Therefore, it is reasonable for an insured to believe that
a viral pandemic, such as COVID-19, is a covered loss even if the
insurer did not intend it to be. Under the modern interpretation
of the reasonable expectations doctrine,155 this expectation
further supports the contention that the policy is ambiguous.
The differences in courts’ opinions, the ISO’s identification
for the need to have a virus exclusion, and the reasonable
expectations of insureds show the presence of ambiguity in a
business interruption insurance policy without a virus exclusion.
Because ambiguity exists, courts can apply the doctrine of contra
proferentem. When the insured shows that the virus has infected
the premises, this doctrine will allow courts to find coverage
under the insured’s policies.
2. Coverage Under the Doctrine of Contra Proferentem
The doctrine of contra proferentem is one of the primary
tools courts use to address ambiguity in insurance policies. 156
Applying this doctrine will allow courts to find coverage for
insureds under their business interruption policies.
Like most insurance policies, insureds typically do not have
an opportunity to negotiate terms for business interruption
policies. 157 Instead, insurers force them to accept the policy “on
a take-it-or-leave-it-basis.”158 Because insureds are not allowed
to make changes to the policy, business interruption insurance
policies are the type of adhesion contract that contra proferentem
addresses.
Under contra proferentem, a court views the insurance
policy as an adhesion contract and interprets any ambiguities in
favor of the insureds.159 The insurers have the ability to draft
the insurance policy as they see fit, 160 and were notified by the

only agree to a general policy and coverage when purchasing insurance coverage
and often do not read the full policy after receiving it).
155. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 58, at 65 (discussing how courts
today use the reasonable expectations doctrine as a tool of interpretation to find
ambiguity).
156. French, supra note 7, at 12–13.
157. French, supra note 7, at 7.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 12–13.
160. Id. at 7.
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ISO’s 2006 circular that standard policy language was not
enough to prevent recovery of virus-based losses and had time to
make the necessary changes.161 Not doing so shows a choice by
the insurance company to leave the policy ambiguous.
Applying contra proferentem, courts must interpret the
ambiguity created by the physical loss or damage requirement
in standard business interruption policies in favor of the
insureds.162 The policy is ambiguous as to whether physical loss
includes contamination by viruses such as COVID-19.163
Therefore, the policy should be interpreted against the insurers
and in favor of finding coverage for pandemic induced losses
when the COVID-19 virus was present on the premises.
This solution, however, will likely face opposition because it
lacks the implementation of a “restoration period.” Restoration
periods are standard in business interruption insurance policies
to limit the period that the insurer must cover the losses. 164
Because the virus, even if located on the property, can be
removed relatively quickly with standard cleaning products, the
restoration period is short if it exists at all. 165
Judge Tunheim’s opinion in Seifert v. IMT Insurance
Company166 may help resolve this issue. His opinion concluded,
in part, “that if a government deems a property dangerous to use
and an owner is thus unable to lawfully realize the business
property’s physical space,” this can be seen as a “cognizable
impairment of function and value” that amounts to a physical
loss of the property.167 This loss, rather than the cleanup of the
virus itself, can provide the restoration period. Although some
may argue that this would constitute a separate loss and
therefore a separate occurrence than the presence of the virus,
both are caused by the same event. The virus itself, when
present on the property, causes the damage that engages
insurance coverage. However, with the government’s declaration
that the virus and pandemic have made businesses unsafe, the

161. ISO Circular, supra note 67, at 1.
162. French, supra note 7, at 12–13.
163. Infra Part III.B.1.
164. Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?, supra note 73.
165. See How to Clean and Disinfect Your Home Against COVID-19, PENN
MED. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.pennmedicine.org/updates/blogs/health-andwellness/2020/april/cleaning-against-covid.
166. 542 F. Supp. 3d 874 (D. Minn. 2021).
167. Id. at 880.
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loss of the business is extended until the premises are deemed
safe. This provides the period of time that is required for the
premises to become usable again, forming a longer restoration
period.
Applying the ambiguity created by the physical loss or
damage requirement to the doctrine of contra proferentem,
combined with Judge Tunheim’s loss of use formulation to create
a restoration period, shows that insureds should be covered for
pandemic-related losses under their business interruption
insurance policies. However, some insurers believe that even if
the policy covers the losses, they should not have to pay them.168
C. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IS AN
UNINSURABLE EVENT
Some insurance companies have promoted an alternate
argument for denying COVID-19 business interruption claims—
that the COVID-19 pandemic is an uninsurable event.169 They
argue that, because of the large number of claims that the
pandemic has produced, they will face insolvency if forced to
pay.170 However, by the nature of their income and the way
business interruption policies are written, insurance companies
will likely be able to survive financially.
Insurance companies have a strong financial backing that
will allow them to survive paying COVID-19 business
interruption claims. Insurers make money in two ways: the
payment of insurance premiums and the investment of such
premiums.171 For example, Cincinnati Insurance Companies,
even without a virus exclusion in their business interruption
insurance policies,172 earned $5.98 billion from premiums alone

168. See Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 8, at 223–27 (discussing insurance
companies’ fear of insolvency if they are forced to pay for COVID-19 business
interruption claims).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. How Insurance Companies Really Make Money and 2 Reasons Why You
Should Care, FRANKLIN L. FIRM, LLP (June 26, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://franklinlawfirm.com/blog/how-insurance-companies-really-make-money-and-2reasons-why-you-should-care/.
172. E.g., Sneak & Dawdle, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 185331 (M.D. Ala., Sept. 28, 2021) (“While the [business interruption]
policy contains a fungi and bacteria exclusion, it does not contain a virus
exclusion.”).
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in 2020. 173 Cincinnati Insurance then made many investments
with this income for a total reported revenue of $7.536 billion.174
Cincinnati Insurance earns this money by selling various types
of insurance,175 thus providing protection even if they need to
pay out a higher number of a single claim type than anticipated.
This
income
method—coming
from
premiums
and
investments—is standard among larger insurers across the
country.176 Having such a strong financial backing will allow
insurers to pay without facing insolvency.
Furthermore, the structure of business interruption
insurance policies will limit the amount that insurers have to
pay. Business interruption policies commonly include policy
limits and restoration periods that cap the insurer’s
responsibility.177 Policy limits, also known as coverage limits,
place a maximum ceiling on what the insurer will pay for a
covered claim.178 Therefore, the policy already limits the
maximum amount that insurers will need to pay. Additionally,
restoration limits will further limit the cost of these claims.
Restoration periods limit the amount of time that an insurer
“will help pay for lost income and extra expenses while the
business is being restored.”179 Their duration is usually thirty
days, but can be extended up to a year through endorsements.180

173. Cincinnati Financial Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2020
Results, CINCINNATI INS. CO. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://cincinnatifinancial
corporation.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/cincinnatifinancial-reports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2020.
174. Id.
175. See Products Marketed, CINCINNATI INS. CO., https://www.cinfin
.com/about-us/products-marketed (last visited Jan. 23, 2022) (showing products
offered by Cincinnati Insurance Companies in each state).
176. Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 8, at 227 (“Insurers receive hundreds
of billions of dollars in premium income alone each year, which in turn has
usually been invested for some time before the funds are required to be paid in
claims. Insurance is generally a more consistently profitable business than
most, advantaged by its ability to amass large sums that can be invested,
perhaps for years . . . before payment.”).
177. Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?, supra note 73.
178. What is an Insurance Limit?, ALLSTATE, https://www.allstate.com/tr
/insurance-basics/limit.aspx (last updated Oct. 2019).
179. Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?, supra note 73.
180. Id. An endorsement, otherwise referred to as a rider, “is [an]
amendment to an existing insurance contract that changes the original policy’s
terms” by adding or removing coverage. Do You Know How to Use an Insurance
Rider or Endorsement?, NAIC (Dec. 30, 2020), https://content.naic.org/article
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This period will shorten the time that insurers need to cover the
lost business income, one of the primary claims insureds are
making in COVID-19 insurance litigation.181 With these limits
in place, insurers have already limited the costs that they would
otherwise have to pay under the policies, making it more feasible
to cover the claims made by insureds during the pandemic.
Finally, not all COVID-19 claims will have to be covered. For
insurers to cover claims, the claims must (1) be made under a
policy that does not have a virus exclusion, and (2) show that the
COVID-19 virus has been on the property to create a physical
loss or damage.182 Without satisfying both elements, the claims
will not need to be paid, further preventing insurance companies
from becoming insolvent.
Insurance companies, through their income strategies and
artificial limiting of policies, have set themselves up to be
financially secure even when forced to pay out a multitude of
claims. 183 Furthermore, they have been on notice of the need for
a virus exclusion to avoid paying viral pandemic-related claims
since 2006. 184 Even if COVID-19 claims will lead to insolvency—
an unlikely result—the lack of planning by some insurers does
not make the COVID-19 pandemic an uninsurable event.
D. 9/11 AND THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT AS A
PATHWAY TO FIND COVERAGE
The COVID-19 pandemic is not the first large-scale event
impacting the insurance industry.185 One particularly large
industry-wide event was the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center.186 These attacks created the most expensive

/consumer_insight_do_you_know_how_use_insurance_rider_or_endorsement
.htm.
181. See Covid Coverage Litigation Tracker, supra note 3 (showing that
COVID-19 insurance claims have mostly been for business income).
182. This path to coverage acts as a synthesis of the previous discussion. The
lack of a virus exclusion allows the ambiguity regarding the physical loss or
damage requirement to exist. Supra Part III.B.1. The presence of the COVID19 virus will then allow that requirement to be met. Supra Part III.A.
183. FRANKLIN L. FIRM, LLP, supra note 171.
184. ISO Circular, supra note 67, at 1.
185. See generally Significant Major Insurance and Reinsurance Industry
Loss Events, REINSURANCE NEWS, https://www.reinsurancene.ws/insuranceindustry-losses-events-data/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (listing recent largescale events causing loss in the insurance industry).
186. Id.
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insurance event in history, costing insurers worldwide
approximately $40–50 billion.187 Even in the face of such large,
industry-changing losses, insureds in the United States received
coverage for their losses.188 This is because (1) a policy exclusion
was found ambiguous and therefore did not exclude losses from
terrorist attacks, 189 and (2) the government created a program
to help cover future losses.190 The process followed in the wake
of 9/11 should act as a roadmap for the COVID-19 pandemic.
Using similar strategies, the government can create coverage for
both the current claims and to protect the insurance industry
and insureds in future viral pandemics.
1. 9/11 Insurance Coverage and the War Exclusion
After the attacks on 9/11, many affected insureds sought
recovery under their business interruption insurance policies.191
Similar to the COVID-19 litigations, the coverage in the 9/11
claims relied on a singular definition—what “war” meant in an
exclusion.192
Unsurprisingly, insurers were not eager to cover the large
number of losses created by 9/11.193 Terrorism attacks, due to
their localized nature and historically small losses, were not
risks that were generally considered during the underwriting
process.194 However, the insurers were forced to provide
coverage for insureds after discovering that the standard war
exclusion in policies did not exclude coverage for terrorist
attacks. 195 The standard war exclusion excluded coverage for
losses incurred by “1) [w]ar, including undeclared or civil war; 2)
[w]arlike action by a military force . . . or 3) insurrection,
rebellion, revolution . . . or action taken by governmental

187. Liedtke & Courbage, supra note 82, at 1.
188. Bailey, supra note 87, at 150.
189. Id.
190. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), supra note 83.
191. See Bailey, supra note 87, at 153–54 (discussing the business
interruption insurance claims after 9/11).
192. Id. at 150.
193. See id. (discussing the insurance industry’s response to losses incurred
by 9/11).
194. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), supra note 83.
195. Bailey, supra note 87, at 150.
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authority in hindering or defending against any of these.”196
Although this exclusion seems promising for insurers, “war” was
often defined as “armed conflict between sovereign nations.”197
Because the 9/11 attacks were caused by an extremist group
rather than a nation, it categorized as a terrorist attack rather
than an act of war.198 Because the policies did not explicitly
exclude terrorist attacks, insurers had to cover the losses. 199
Similarly, the COVID-19 cases have been decided based on
a single definition—this time of the word “physical”—and the
application of exclusions.200 The word “physical,” similar to the
war exclusion in the 9/11 claims, does not on its face deny
coverage to claims. Instead, it creates an ambiguity that allows
courts to rule in favor of the insureds and find coverage.201
Because coverage is available, the 9/11 claims have set a
standard that an explicit exclusion is needed to deny coverage.202
In policies that do not have a virus exclusion, there is no
negation of coverage if the insureds can show that the virus was
present on the premises, and the courts should rule accordingly.
The COVID-19 and 9/11 litigation situations are similar in
more than just the core analysis. They also both created large
losses for the insurance industry that the industry does not
believe it can cover, especially when faced with future events of
the same kind.203 To fix this, the federal government should
196. Greg Munro, Exclusions for War and Terrorism: Who Will Pay for ManMade Catastrophes?, 17 FAC. J. ARTICLES & OTHER WRITINGS 25, 29 (2002),
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/17/.
197. Bailey, supra note 87, at 150; see also, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d Cir. 1974) (“English
and American cases dealing with the insurance meaning of ‘war’ have defined
it in accordance with the ancient international law definition: war refers to and
includes only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute governments at
least de facto in character.”).
198. Bailey, supra note 87, at 150.
199. See id.
200. See supra Part III.A (discussing the ambiguity created by the “physical
loss of damage to” covered property requirement and the applicable exclusions).
201. See supra Part III.B (applying the policy’s ambiguity to the doctrine of
contra proferentem to find coverage for insureds).
202. See Bailey, supra note 87, at 150 (“Terrorism is covered under most
policies . . . not necessarily in explicit terms but rather than by virtue of not
being specifically excluded in the grant of coverage section of the standard
policy . . . .”).
203. See id. at 151 (“The insurance industry [responded] . . . ’[w]e don’t have
the capital to survive another event like this and still be able to pay for all of
our other, existing commitments.’”); Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA),
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create a national program to help cover future similar events
like it did with TRIA in the wake of 9/11.
2. 9/11 as a Blueprint for Covering Future Viral Pandemic
Insurance Claims
The combined efforts of the insurance industry and the
federal government following the attacks on 9/11 show a path to
coverage for the current COVID-19 insurance litigation and
future viral pandemics. Insurance is primarily regulated on a
state-by-state basis, with the federal government interfering
only in special cases.204 However, to ensure that insurance
companies would continue covering terrorism after 9/11, the
government created a program to offset potential losses that the
insurance industry might face.205 This program, called TRIA,206
provides a blueprint the government can follow to assist the
insurance industry and find coverage for insureds in the current
COVID-19 pandemic.
Congress implemented TRIA to fill a gap in coverage created
by insurance companies after 9/11.207 Following paying out
insurance claims created by the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the
insurance industry was unwilling to cover similar future
losses.208 As a result, many insurance companies stopped
offering terrorism coverage, and those that still did charged
premiums that were unaffordable for many consumers. 209 They
labeled terrorism losses as an uninsurable risk, and the ISO
received “permission to exclude terrorism from all commercial
supra note 83 (“Fearing future losses were unsustainable and uncertain of the
large-scale risk, insurers defined terrorism as an uninsurable risk.”); Knutsen
& Stempel, supra note 8, at 223–27 (discussing insurance companies’ fear of
insolvency if they are forced to pay for COVID-19 business interruption claims).
204. Commercial Insurance: Regulation, supra note 39.
205. WEBEL, supra note 95, at summary (“Under TRIA, the government
would share the losses on commercial property and casualty insurance should
a foreign terrorist attack occur, with potential recoupment of this loss sharing
after the fact.”).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Bailey, supra note 87, at 151 (“The insurance industry’s earlier
response, ‘We will pay,’ was revised to ‘We will pay—for this one—but not
another one.’”).
209. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), supra note 83. This was largely
caused by the reinsurance industry’s decision to “severely cut back on their
terrorism coverage” if they continued to offer it at all, leaving insurers without
protection if they decided to take on the risk. Id.
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insurance coverage” in 45 states. 210 TRIA filled this gap by
creating a federal program to help insurance companies pay for
claims over a set threshold.211 In turn, the government then had
a chance to recoup these costs through surcharges on the cost of
the terrorism insurance policies.212
The COVID-19 pandemic has placed insurers in a similar
position to where they were after the 9/11 attacks—they fear
financial insolvency if forced to take on the current or future
viral pandemic losses.213 Insureds are therefore currently facing
a coverage gap, and it is possible that any insurer offering viral
pandemic coverage in the future will do so at exorbitant rates.
COVID-19 will not be the last viral pandemic. 214 To protect
insureds now and in future viral pandemics, the government
should create a program similar to TRIA to provide coverage and
protect insureds.
This program can take after the blueprint provided by
TRIA.215 Using the COVID-19 pandemic as a baseline, the
government can analyze the business interruption and other
insurance losses the insurance industry has suffered. The
government can use this data to generate a minimum level that
the losses must meet before the government becomes involved.
210. Id. Terrorism was excluded in commercial insurance coverage in every
state except California, Florida, Georgia, New York, and Texas. Id.
211. WEBEL, supra note 95, at 3. The size of the loss needed for TRIA to
apply has changed over time. Id. The most recent amount threshold is $200
million, with insurers paying a deductible “equaling 20% of an insurer’s annual
direct earned premiums for the commercial property and casualty lines of
insurance specified in TRIA.” Id. at 4.
212. Id. at 5. In 2019, the recoupment provisions required the Treasury “to
recoup 140% of the government outlays” for “attacks that that result in under
$37.5 billion in insured losses.” Id. The Treasury Secretary has discretionary
authority over recouping all or only a portion of government outlays for larger
events. Id. at 5–6.
213. See Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 8, at 223–27 (discussing insurance
companies’ fear of insolvency if they are forced to pay for COVID-19 business
interruption claims); Bailey, supra note 87, at 151 (discussing the insurance
industry’s unwillingness to pay for future terrorism losses).
214. See Michael Penn, Statistics Say Large Pandemics Are More Likely than
We Thought, DUKE GLOB. HEALTH INST. (Aug. 23, 2021), https://globalhealth
.duke.edu/news/statistics-say-large-pandemics-are-more-likely-we-thought
(“[T]he probability of a pandemic with similar impact to COVID-19 is about 2%
in any year, meaning that someone born in the year 2000 would have about a
38% chance of experiencing one by now.”).
215. For discussion and analysis of the most recent version of TRIA, see
WEBEL, supra note 95, at 2–6 and McHugh, supra note 9, at 510–20 (proposing
a TRIA-based plan for pandemic insurance coverage).
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After that, the program can follow the same principles as TRIA
and promote two major principles. First, similar to TRIA’s “make
available” provisions, 216 it can mandate that insurers have a
reasonably-priced viral pandemic insurance available for
consumers, with the minutia of such policies determined by the
individual states. Second, it will have the government cover
claims above the deductible level set based on the insurer’s size
and allow the government to recoup those losses through
surcharges on the insurers. By doing so, the government will
ensure that insureds are covered in the future and eliminate the
need for the discussion of coverage under the physical loss or
damage requirement of the standard business interruption
insurance policy.217
Some insurers, while supporting a federal program to lower
pandemic risk to businesses, oppose a federal program modeled
after TRIA. 218 They argue that the pandemic risks, due to their
large scope and correlated losses, cannot be properly accounted
for with traditional underwriting techniques.219 Instead,
insurers propose the “Business Continuity Protection

216. See WEBEL, supra note 95, at 11 (“TRIA’s ‘make available’ provisions
addressed the availability problem in the terrorism insurance market, as
insurers were required by law to offer commercial terrorism coverage.”).
217. Rep. Mike Thompson (D-CA-5) has introduced a bill to Congress that
would require insurers to make viral pandemic coverage available to insureds
under their business interruption insurance policy. Business Interruption
Insurance Coverage Act of 2020, H.R. 6494, 116th Cong. (2020). This bill does
not appear to provide coverage to those currently suffering COVID-19 business
interruption losses and does not include government help for payment of claims
similar to TRIA or what is discussed above. Id. Additionally, Rep. Carolyn
Maloney (D-NY) has introduced H.R. 7011, the Pandemic Risk Insurance Act of
2021. Claire Wilkinson, Second Version of PRIA Introduced, BUS. INS. (Nov. 2,
2021), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20211102/NEWS06/9123456
71/Second-version-of-PRIA-introduced-Pandemic-Risk-Insurance-Act-CarolynMaloney-Ne. This proposed legislation is modeled after TRIA and requires
“insurers to offer pandemic risk coverage in all critical commercial lines of
insurance, including business interruption and specialty lines such as event
cancellation.” Id. This program, however, does not contain any recoupment
provision and has been met with backlash from the American Property Casualty
Insurance Association. Id. For a deeper discussion of the various legislative
proposals, see generally McHugh, supra note 9.
218. Susanne Sclafane, P/C Insurers Back a Federal Pandemic Loss Fund
but Not a Backstop Like TRIA, INS. J. (May 19, 2020), https://www.insurance
journal.com/news/national/2020/05/19/569115.htm.
219. Id.
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Program.”220 This program, run by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), would provide businesses the
option to “purchase federal revenue replacement assistance
through state-regulated insurance entities that participate with
BCPP on a voluntary basis.”221 FEMA would then make
payments to the participating businesses “once there is a
presidential viral emergency declaration.”222
In many ways, this proposal mirrors the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP is a federal insurance
program, also managed by FEMA, that provides flood insurance
to homeowners, business owners, and renters. 223 Although the
program provides coverage, the premiums insureds pay “are not
priced to be actuarially sound” and therefore are not an accurate
representation of risk.224 Additionally, many insureds under the
program have long-standing subsidies that further lower the
rates they pay.225 While this makes the program beneficial for
those seeking protection from floods, it has led to the NFIP
incurring a large amount of debt.226 At the end of 2021, this debt
totaled $20.525 billion.227
There is no indication that a fully federally funded pandemic
insurance program would lead to a different result. Rather,
pandemics provide a larger challenge to the government to
develop actuarially sound rates. Insurers have already admitted
that they cannot underwrite pandemics with traditional

220. Insurers, Agents Propose Pandemic Business Relief Plan; Plaintiffs
Offer BIG Compromise, INS. J. (May 22, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal
.com/news/national/2020/05/22/569611.htm.
221. Id.
222. Id. Other features of the BCPP include: (1) Businesses “would have to
certify” that the funds are being used for “retaining employees and paying
necessary operating expenses,” and (2) protection is only provided if purchased
a minimum of 90 days before the viral emergency declaration. Id.
223. Flood Insurance, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
224. Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, Reforming the National Flood Insurance
Program: Toward Private Flood Insurance, CATO INST. (July 19, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/reforming-national-flood-insuranceprogram-toward-private-flood-insurance.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. CONG. RSCH. SERV., NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
BORROWING AUTHORITY 3, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/IN10784.pdf (last
updated Dec. 9, 2021). The debt remains this high even after the NFIP had $16
billion of its debt cancelled on Oct. 26, 2017. Id.
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techniques.228 Although viral pandemics are far less common
than floods,229 the large correlated losses would lead to the
government program taking on a large amount of debt that it
may not be able to pay back.230 Therefore, a pandemic
reinsurance program, sponsored by the government and
containing a recoupment provision similar to that of the TRIA,
is a better option because it will better limit the amount of
coverage provided by the government.
TRIA has set a precedent for federal intervention in the
insurance industry and has created a blueprint for a longstanding federal program to bolster the insurance industry.231
While the proposed program will protect insureds in the future,
the government also needs to provide coverage to insureds now.
With courts consistently ruling in favor of the insurers, 232 many
insureds are stuck without the proper coverage they need to
adequately recover.233 To remedy this situation, the government
can include a retroactive coverage provision in the recovery
program to cover past COVID-19 related business interruption
insurance claims. However, this method would likely take a long
time to get through Congress, and many business owners need
payments as soon as possible. 234
3. Executive Orders as an Alternative Path to Coverage
To speed up the process of assisting insureds, the President
can enact an executive order creating a short-term payment

228. Susanne Sclafane, supra note 218.
229. See Michael Penn, supra note 214 (finding that there is a 2% chance of
a viral pandemic, such as COVID-19, occurring in any given year).
230. Susanne Sclafane, supra note 218.
231. See WEBEL, supra note 95, at 2–3 (discussing the passing of a bill
extending TRIA until Dec. 31, 2027).
232. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the Covid-19 business interruption
insurance litigation and common outcome in favor of the insurers).
233. Fairlie, supra note 28, at 728 (discussing the decreased number of
business owners in the first few months of the pandemic); Dua et al., supra note
32 (“Recovery will take time . . . [and] will depend on both economic
vulnerability to the COVID-19 response and the prevailing macroeconomic
outlook in their respective industries. Across all businesses, that could take five
years or longer.”).
234. See How a Bill Becomes a Law, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/How-Bill-Becomes-Law
(last visited Jan. 26, 2022) (explaining the multiple steps required for a bill to
become a law); Kaplan, supra note 35 (“[A]n extra 200,000 businesses in the US
closed in 2020.”).
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program for business owners. The President has the ability to
authorize such payment programs, as seen by the Executive
Order on Economic Relief Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic
signed into action on January 22, 2021. 235 This order authorized
the government to send out payments to businesses and
individuals to relieve some of the financial distress caused by the
pandemic.236 By effecting a similar executive order, the
President can create at least partial coverage for insureds that
surcharges can later recoup in association with the program
discussed above. Even if the government cannot absorb the full
amount of every claim, covering at least a portion of the insured’s
losses may greatly help businesses recover from the pandemic.
This plan, however, may face backlash because it is similar
to the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans and would
potentially be subject to the same type of abuse. The PPP loans
provided assistance to “small and midsize businesses to help
them survive the coronavirus crisis.”237 Under the program,
banks and financial institutions provided loans, backed by the
Small Business Administration, to businesses. 238 These loans
could be used for payroll costs such as employee compensation
and benefits payments, and non-payroll costs such as rent,
utilities, and property damage costs.239 For many businesses,
these loans could later be forgiven.240 Some have argued,
however, that these loans did not have their intended effect. One
of the main reasons for this is that the payments generally did
not go to the businesses hit the hardest by the pandemic.241

235. Exec. Order No. 14002, 86 Fed. Reg. 7229 (Jan. 22, 2021).
236. Id. at 7229.
237. Jordan Weissmann, The Paycheck Protection Program Was a Flop,
SLATE (July 24, 2020), https://slate.com/business/2020/07/paycheck-protectionprogram-was-a-flop.html.
238. How Does the Paycheck Protection Program Impact the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPAs)?, U.S. DEP’T COM. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS,
https://www.bea.gov/help/faq/1408 (last updated May 17, 2021); Owen Yin,
What is the Paycheck Protection Program? (A Simple Guide), B ENCH (May 5,
2021), https://bench.co/blog/operations/paycheck-protection-program/.
239. What do Business Need to Know About Paycheck Protection Program
Loan Forgiveness, PAYCHEX WORX, https://www.paychex.com/articles
/compliance/payroll-protection-program (last updated May 7, 2021).
240. See id. (discussing the steps to take and requirements needed for a PPP
loan to be forgiven).
241. Amanda Fischer, Did the Paycheck Protection Program Work for Small
Businesses Across the United States?, WASH. CTR. EQUITABLE GROWTH (July 15,
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While the government intended the program to help small
businesses, many larger organizations such as Shake Shack and
the Church of Scientology also received loans. 242 Furthermore,
the number of loans provided often varied by the number of
financial institutions in the area.243
An executive order authorizing a program to cover
pandemic-related business interruption may have similar
problems. However, the federal government can use the PPP
loans as a guide to make changes to ensure that the businesses
most in need of the coverage receive it. Additionally, by
administering the program themselves rather than using
private banks and financial institutions, the government will be
able to check each company requesting payments. Finally, the
government can require documentation from each business that
shows what losses they incurred and that they had business
interruption insurance during the pandemic. This will limit the
number and value of payments the government needs to make.
Additionally, this will allow the government to set a minimum
threshold for losses that it will cover, similar to the deductible
requirements of TRIA.244
A potentially more significant issue for this plan is whether
the federal government has the authority to step in and pay
insurance claims. As a general principle, the individual states
are responsible for their insurance law regulation. 245 This was
made official in the McCarran Ferguson Act, which stated that
“[t]he business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of
several States” and that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”246 This
plan, however, would not violate the McCarran Ferguson Act
because it does not create a law regulating the insurance
industry.
An executive order authorizing a program to pay insureds’
business interruption insurance claims does not create a law
regulating the insurance industry. Rather, it generates a
2020), https://equitablegrowth.org/did-the-paycheck-protection-program-workfor-small-businesses-across-the-united-states/.
242. Weissmann, supra note 237.
243. Fischer, supra note 241.
244. See WEBEL, supra note 95 (discussing the deductible provision of TRIA).
245. Commercial Insurance: Regulation, supra note 39.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
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pathway for insureds to receive coverage outside of their insurer
claim processes. The insurers themselves are free to continue
their standard business practices and will be unaffected.
Therefore, the federal government has the authority to
implement this plan as it does not violate the McCarran
Ferguson Act.
Recent executive orders have shown that the President has
the authority to create a program providing payments to those
in need.247 Using that power to create a program to cover
insureds’ pandemic related business interruption claims will
ensure that they are getting proper coverage even if their
insurers and the courts believe that their claims are invalid.
By creating a federal program that ensures future viral
pandemic coverage for insureds and implementing a strategy to
help insureds with their current losses, many insureds can
receive the help and peace of mind they need now and in the
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented event that
has significantly affected the world. From countless infections to
government-mandated stay-at-home orders, businesses lost
income and were forced to close.248 Many business owners
believed that their business interruption insurance policies
would cover these losses, but insurers have repeatedly denied
these claims. A closer look at the policy language, however,
reveals ambiguity that should lead to coverage under the
doctrine of contra proferentem.249 And, by using 9/11 insurance
developments as a guide, the government can step in to assist
the insurance industry and protect insureds in the current and
future pandemics.250

247. See Exec. Order No. 14002, supra note 235, at 7229 (implementing a
plan to provide relief payments to individuals, families, and businesses to
relieve the financial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic).
248. Kaplan, supra note 35.
249. See supra Part III.B. (discussing how the doctrine of contra proferentem
can be applied to the ambiguity in a standard business interruption insurance
policy in the context of COVID-19 to provide coverage for insureds).
250. See supra Part III.D. (discussing the potential of using a TRIA-based
federal reinsurance program and an executive order as an alternative path to
provide coverage for insureds).
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The current COVID-19 business interruption insurance
litigation highlights the primary arguments occurring in the
courts: First, that viral exclusions prevent coverage for losses
sustained from the pandemic, and second, that the COVID-19
virus cannot cause the physical damage required by the policy.
However, for policies without a virus exclusion, the standard
physical loss or damage requirement is ambiguous at best. This
ambiguity is made prominent by the plain meaning of the word
“physical,”251 and by some courts’ rulings that the presence of the
virus on the property can create a valid claim.252
Faced with this ambiguity, the courts can then apply the
doctrine of contra proferentem. This doctrine will allow the
courts to apply a central tenet of insurance law—that
ambiguities in the insurance policy should be resolved in favor
of the insured—and find coverage for the insureds.253
In addition, some insurers are claiming that the COVID-19
pandemic is an uninsurable event that they cannot cover. But,
while the losses may be significant, the strong financial backing
of insurance companies and the insurance industry will be
enough to keep insurers afloat.254
Finally, to ensure that business interruption insurance
policies cover insureds during the current COVID-19 pandemic
and potential future pandemics, the federal government needs
to step in and create a plan similar to TRIA. TRIA cemented
terrorism insurance into the American insurance industry when
insurers did not want to provide it.255 By using TRIA as a
blueprint, alongside an executive order providing coverage for
current business interruption claims, the government can again
protect the public, both now and in the future.
The current result of COVID-19 business interruption
insurance litigation is setting a dangerous precedent for future
extreme events. By continually finding that insurers do not need

251. See supra Part III.B.1. (analyzing how the word “physical” is ambiguous
in the context of COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims).
252. See Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 478 F.Supp.3d 794, 400
(W.D. Mo. 2020) (finding that “Plaintiffs adequately alleged a direct physical
loss” by claiming that the COVID-19 virus is a physical substance that is
present on the surfaces of their business).
253. See French, supra note 7, at 12–15 (discussing the doctrines of contra
proferentem and reasonable expectations in insurance policy interpretation).
254. Knutsen & Stempel, supra note 8, at 227.
255. WEBEL, supra note 95, at 2–6, 11.
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to cover their insureds’ claims even in the absence of a virus
exclusion, the courts are allowing insurers to profit off
ambiguous policies that do not clearly set out the scope of
coverage. While this Note advocates for courts to rule in favor of
the insureds in a relatively small group of cases—those in which
the policy does not include a virus exclusion—it will force
insurers to be clear in their drafting and force them to include
well-known and available exclusions for risks they are not
willing to cover. This, combined with a federal pandemic
reinsurance program similar to TRIA, will ensure that insureds
are protected and will have clearer policies in future pandemics
and other extreme events affecting the insurance industry.

***

